



Evolution & Sociology

Fall 2004 Newsletter of the ASA Section-in-formation on Evolution and Sociology Volume 1, No. 2

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Message From the Chair

Alexandra Maryanski
University of California at Riverside

Congratulations to all of us! We are now a section-in-formation. Let me begin by thanking Rosemary Hopcroft for all her hard work. It was she who put in the many hours getting this section-in-formation off the ground. And, it was she who hustled to get the necessary signatures to make our budding section in Evolution and Sociology a possibility. Rosemary has carried the evolutionary banner thus far, and it is now up to us to muster the energy and get the necessary 300 permanent members in the next two years. But how should we proceed?

We stand apart from most new budding sections in that sociology has actively resisted bringing biology into sociology for a long time. In fact, it came as a surprise to many of us that Rosemary even got the requisite number of signatures to even get us this far. I don't need to tell you that we are at a critical juncture and, that, our chances of success are problematic. It has been many years since sociologists were scared silly over E.O. Wilson's statement that biology would bury sociology. While Wilson certainly did not mean that literally, sociologists were badly shaken up by early sociobiological theory and determined to fend off any attempts to lose sociology to the biological wolves. I'm sure many sociologists never read Wilson's monumental Sociobiology published in 1980, but feeling threatened they piled up large academic blocks that effectively shut out evolutionary reasoning

**If each of us gets just two more
ASA members to join the section,
the section will be permanent!**

in sociology. It was into this milieu that I formally became a sociologist.

My academic background is interdisciplinary—yes, if truth be told, I came into sociology with strong credentials in anthropology, having earned a B.S, M.A. and ABD in anthropology with specializations in anthropological theory, human paleontology and primates. However, while outlining a dissertation on stump-tail macaques, I discovered social network analysis and realized it was the perfect method to pursue my ongoing interest in human nature. So, I applied to UC Irvine's new social network program, and under the guidance of Linton Freeman, earned an M.A. in social network analysis and a PhD in social science. After writing a dissertation on African Ape Social Networks (one of the first, I might add, to apply network theory to primates), I joined the UCR sociology department in 1987. Since sociology and anthropology are sister disciplines, I began publishing papers on neofunctionalism, structuralism and social network theory. But I wanted to pursue my work on monkeys and apes because I saw them as a distant mirror for insights into hominid evolution and human nature. The problem was that sociology was not receptive to work that embraced evolutionary ideas, fossils and primates. Again and again, my papers to sociology journals were returned with the recommendation that I send them to anthropology "or another appropriate journal that accepts articles on animals...the study of primates is irrelevant in sociology." However, I kept repackaging my ideas in sociological guise and with a little help from my friends, I slowly began to publish on evolution in sociologically oriented journals. Yet, again and again, I encountered resistance to the idea that biology is relevant for sociology. Even talking about human proclivities made some sociologists testy and referring to humans as "evolved apes" didn't help my case at all.

But slowly the discipline's attitude began to soften, in part because evolutionary reasoning became so mainstream in general academic circles and in the popular media as well. Yes, tomatoes are no longer thrown at E. O. Wilson (they really were) but we are a long way from

gaining full acceptance in sociology. Still, sociologists are now opening their minds to the idea that evolution and biology may have a place in sociology. And, we need to capitalize on this potential interest. The good news is that evolutionary minded sociologists are finding it easier to get their papers published in mainstream sociological journals (e.g. Social Forces and Sociological Theory). Thus, an evolutionary ethos is brewing in sociology, but how do we use this interest to shore up our membership?

First, we need to face up to our differences. We are a very eclectic group, often working alone in our application of biology and evolutionary theory. While we share a common evolutionary paradigm, our approaches are divergent and sometimes at odds with each other. In truth, a field is enriched by debate and controversy--witness human paleontology with its hominid lumpers and splitters. But this sub-field is well grounded; ours can easily meet an ugly fate. To succeed, we need to put our differences aside and adhere to the old "principle of complementary opposition," by joining hands and working together to make this section-in-formation a reality. So let's rally around the old evolutionary totem and sign up some new members. In this pursuit, I have some suggestions:

1. We should encourage any scientifically minded sociologist to join our section. Everyone is welcome! Few sociologists know a lot about biology or evolutionary theory but some are becoming curious, perhaps realizing that we have drifted too far away from the natural sciences.
2. We must make our first ASA formal session representative of the varying interests of our membership. In this regard, I have asked Timothy Crippen to be both organizer and discussant, a role that he has accepted. To recruit possible new members, Tim and I agree that the presentations need to be kept to a maximum of four to provide enough time for some real content, followed by Tim's very brief summary of the papers. This way attending sociologists without an evolutionary background can get an idea of the various approaches (someday we might even

offer evolutionary workshops). Equally important, we need to encourage audience participation by leaving lots of time for questions and comments. I'm hoping that the papers will encourage a lively open discussion. We'll be calling for papers soon, so please send Tim your ideas as we need representative papers to maximize our section's "reproductive" success

3. We need a great reception at the next ASA. To attract sociologists to our cause I'm working on that.

Rosemary opened a bolted door. We need to take advantage of her efforts because it may take another 20 years before a brave sociologist again tackles the job. So put aside your lone scholar hat for now and pick up your collective hat. We need your help in getting other sociologists on the bandwagon. Some suggestions:

1. Sign up graduate students by paying their section dues for Evolution and Sociology. The cost is only \$5.00.

2. Send us the names of any perspective faculty who might have an interest in evolutionary work. We will immediately send them a copy of the newsletter.

3. Send Rosemary your ideas and comments so we can include them in the newsletter.

Finally, let me close by saying that I deeply appreciate the honor of becoming the first Acting Chair for Evolution and Sociology. I promise you I will do my best to get this section going but I cannot do it alone. If you believe that evolutionary theory belongs in sociology, you have an obligation to help make it so.

All Good Wishes,
Alexandra

P.S. Please e-mail me with your questions, comments, ideas or?

alexandra.maryanski@ucr.edu

Section News

Rosemary L. Hopcroft
University of North Carolina at Charlotte

The organizational session at this year's ASA meetings went quite smoothly. Thank you to all who attended. We achieved what we needed to achieve, which was appoint an acting chair, acting treasurer-secretary, a nominating committee, six council members, plus a newsletter editor and webperson. Thank you for all who agreed to fill a section office or serve on the council. After we have achieved full section status (2007) we will have elections.

We also voted on the name of the section, which was changed from the Section on Evolution and Social Behavior to Evolution and Sociology. People have expressed concerns to me that the name excludes those only interested in biological processes and sociology. However, as Alexandra has noted, the section is open to all willing to analyze the relationship between the biological and the sociological in a scientific fashion. Further, if the council approves a vote by the section membership, the name can be changed again if the membership decides (perhaps to Evolution, Biology and Sociology).

We finally obtained official section-information status in September. Now we have two years (until the end of 2006) to obtain 300 members. Please encourage your colleagues and students to join. If everyone recruits just two new members, we will have achieved our goal. For information on joining, see the last page of this newsletter. The section was formed to allow sociologists to legitimately incorporate evolution and biology into their theories and research. So, all who want to do this (in whatever way) are very welcome! Certainly, we need to advertise the section as widely as possible. Feel free to do whatever you want in this respect. It is our section, and will live and die by our efforts!

I am pleased to see people making use of the e-mail list and this newsletter to disseminate information of interest to section members, and I strongly encourage this. Please feel free to send out any relevant

announcement yourself, or send it to me to put in the newsletter or out on our listserve.

I also want to encourage all of you to actively test evolutionary hypotheses! Sociology has a large reserve of high quality data sets, largely untapped by evolutionary researchers. It is a veritable gold mine. We have the data (much of it appropriate), we have the tools, and of course, a better theory! The future is ours! Remember we get at least one session each year at ASA for the next 2 years, 2 sessions when we obtain our goal of 300 members.

Last, the Meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution society is a fascinating and stimulating, not to mention morale enhancing, event and I would like to encourage sociologists to attend and just see the exciting work being done in other scientific and social scientific disciplines. Last year I put together a panel of sociologists to present at the conference, and the papers were well received. I am planning to do the same. If you are interested in participating in such a panel, please let me know.

Rosemary L. Hopcroft
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**The next meeting of the
Human Behavior and Evolution
Society will be
June 1 - 5, 2005 at the
University of Texas, Austin
See www.hbes.com
for more details**

*For interviews with important
Darwinian thinkers
(including Trivers, Hamilton,
Dawkins...) go to
www.froes.dds.nl*

Evolutionary Theory and Human Development

Robert L. Burgess
Penn State University

In 1962, I decided to do graduate work at Washington University, St. Louis because it had a distinguished faculty in its sociology-anthropology department and a strong concentration in social psychology. A principal attraction was its multi-disciplinary focus which was ideal for a young student who could not decide which academic discipline to pursue. In retrospect, it was an excellent decision because it offered me the intellectual challenge, diversity, and flexibility that I was looking for. From 1965 to 1975, I was a faculty member in the Sociology Department at the University of Washington, Seattle. This perennially outstanding department also gave me the freedom to pursue my unconventional interests. Finally, in 1975, in part because of my interest in socialization processes, a topic that sociologists addressed less and less often, I joined the multi-disciplinary faculty of the College of Human Development at Penn State. My view that no one discipline by itself could capture the complexity of human behavior, had obviously remained unchanged as it still does today. This perspective is evident in what follows which are excerpts from the introductory chapter of a book, *Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Development* I just published with my psychology colleague, Kevin MacDonald.

For several decades, increasing attention has been devoted to exploring the joint function of nature and nurture for understanding human behavior and its development. Most of the effort on the nature side of the equation has been focused on the proximate emphases of quantitative genetics and, increasingly, molecular genetics. Much less attention has been given to the implications of evolutionary theory which underlies both. It is for this reason that the central theme of this book is the importance of evolutionary biology for understanding the nature and directions of human development.

A reader might well ask: "Why the theory of evolution?" The reason is that it is the most general theory we have in the life sciences. It unifies the disciplines of microbiology, medicine, psychology, anthropology, and sociology. Theories are important because science is concerned not only with establishing relationships between phenomena (empirical research) but also explaining why these relationships obtain. Theories, in other words, are explanations of empirically established relationships. Empirically based general theories add simplicity and parsimony to the understanding of how our complex world works. Once we have identified general theoretical principles, we then are able to make predictions about other phenomena.

To suggest, as the authors of this book have, that evolutionary theory is important because it is the most general theory in the life sciences is not to deny the significance of the disciplines of anthropology, psychology, or sociology nor the middle-range theories that have emerged and been tested therein, such as attachment theory, learning theory, exchange theory, and rational choice theory, to name a few. The behavioral and social sciences have made many empirical discoveries, but the central intellectual problems of these fields are not analytic, that is, discovering new and fundamental general theories. My view, and at least implicitly the view of the other contributors to this book, is that our most important general theoretical principles have already been discovered and they are the principles of the theory of evolution by natural selection.

The problems facing the behavioral and social sciences are essentially synthetic: showing how genes and environments in accordance with evolutionary principles combine to produce our common human nature and the diversity of ways in which this nature is manifested. This is precisely what the various contributors of this book have attempted, from the evolution and function of human intelligence (Chs. 2, 3, and 4) and language (Ch. 5), to the evolution, function, and development of social emotions (Ch. 7) and personality traits (Ch. 8). Similar efforts are directed to explaining the development of

moral judgments (Ch. 9) and psychopathology (Ch. 14), the range and function of parental investment (Chs. 6 and 11), the structure and function of adolescence (Ch. 12), the ways in which vital resources are acquired in different cultural contexts (Ch. 13), and the importance of the coefficient of relatedness for understanding altruism, cooperation, and competition (Ch. 10). In each chapter, new insights into old topics emerged from the authors' use of the telephoto lens of evolutionary theory in combination with the wide-angle lens of anthropology and sociology and the macro lens of psychology and behavior genetics.

Another reason for examining the developmental implications of evolutionary theory is that empirical support for the theory has been increasing at such an increasing rate that it can no longer be ignored by the behavioral and social sciences. This has been the case ever since the breaking of the genetic code. We have now what is essentially a molecular time clock that allows us to estimate the elapsed time since species split off from a common ancestor.

Differences do exist, however, about how evolutionary theory can best be used to explain human behavior and its development in different contexts. Evolutionary psychologists have emphasized the role of evolved psychological mechanisms. Behavioral ecologists, instead, have emphasized how ecological factors influence adaptive behavior. These differences notwithstanding, evolutionary scientists have been primarily interested in explaining pan-human traits, that is, those behaviors that all humans share. Such traits include bi-parental care, long-term pair bonding, language, our lengthy childhood, deception, cooperation, trust, jealousy, violence, and so on. We take these traits for granted, and we should, because we all share a common human nature. To be sure, there are differences. There are different languages, different dialects of the same language, and different customs, for example, afternoon siestas, genital mutilation, residential seclusion, and different rules of inheritance and residence. But there are limits to these differences, and no societies or cultures have succeeded in banishing other common human

behaviors, such as fear, lust, sloth, adultery, or theft.

What needs to be understood is that the only viable scientific theory we have to explain this common, species-specific nature is the theory of evolution. There is no competitor. For Darwin, and for evolutionary scientists today, complex designs are the products of gradual step-by-step changes in the traits of living things. These steps were small, and they occurred over millions of years, involving millions of individuals. For this process of natural selection to be true, however, there had to be a way for these changes to be passed on from one generation to the next. Darwin was not quite sure how this worked, but work it must. Today, of course, we know. We have identified the conditions necessary for evolution by natural selection to take place. First, there must be a continual source of genetic variation. This source is random mutation, which refers to DNA copying errors that occur during cell division. The current estimate is that there are approximately 30 mutations per genome per generation. Second, there must be non-random selection of those genetic variations that solve adaptive problems better than earlier versions. Third, there is a mechanism that permits these variation (adaptations) to be passed on to future generations, namely, the amazing, self-copying DNA molecule. Finally, there is a fourth important force in evolution, genetic drift. Given geographic mobility, individuals who split off from parent populations may, because of different selection pressures, eventually become genetically dissimilar in certain ways from the population from which they originated.

Despite the fact that these conditions are well established, there are those who refuse to accept the importance and relevance of evolutionary theory, especially for understanding human behavior. One reason for this reluctance is the fear of reductionism. However, reductionism need not mean replacing one field of knowledge with another, but rather, linking them. The bad reputation of reductionism stems in part from a concern for disciplinary loyalty. There need be no concern here. In biology, explanation is generally felt to occur on four complementary levels of

analysis, and these different levels reflect the often different concerns and theories of the various behavioral and social sciences. These four levels include the evolutionary history of a trait, the adaptive function of a trait, the development of the trait in an individual's life span, and the specific proximate mechanisms that cause a trait to be expressed at a particular time and place. It should be recognized that a common thread runs through each of these analytical levels and that the first two levels (evolutionary history and adaptiveness) are more general than the last two (development and proximate antecedents). A moment's reflection will reveal why this is the case: A genetic process must be involved in each of the four levels. The development of a behavior must involve genetic action in some way, and the potential or capacity to exhibit a behavior must have been adaptive at some point in time. All four levels of analysis appear in the chapters of this book.

Regarding these levels of analysis, it must be understood that to claim that a trait is a product of natural selection does not imply that it can occur without experience, without development, or without a particular environmental stimulus. It is also important to remember that human traits, as evolved designs, can be and often are manifested in different ways in different circumstances. That is why biologists distinguish between genotypes and phenotypes.

Individual development is, of course, the main topic of this book. Nor have evolutionary scientists ignored development. The concept of the phenotype, as a product of genotypes, is to acknowledge the flexible ways in which individuals respond to varying environmental circumstances. The ability to adapt to different environments and to learn different things is surely a product of natural selection. This, in turn, suggests that learning is a product of the action of genes — it is, in other words, an evolved ability. This does not mean, however, that learning and phenotypes are necessarily independent of evolutionary history. Nature limits and channels nurture and is expressed through nurture.

Behavioral and social scientists have always been interested in human differences as well as similarities. Cultural and

evolutionary anthropologists, for example, have been interested in both. The field of developmental psychology, especially, has been interested in individual differences. Up to this point, I have emphasized similarity — our shared human nature — and the importance of evolutionary theory to explain that nature. We will now turn our attention to individual differences. Yet we need not put away our evolutionary telephoto lens because there exists an interesting apparent paradox; namely, the same differences are found all over the world and in all cultures. Everywhere, we find similar individual differences in personality, temperament, intelligence, psychopathology, antisocial behavior, and so on.

That said, how exactly do we reconcile the idea that all humans, fundamentally, are the same while also acknowledging that we are all individuals and unique in some ways? How can there be a universal, species-specific human nature when every human being is unique? The answer to this apparent paradox begins with our genetic code, which makes us uniquely human and uniquely different from every other person on this planet. Natural selection is the second mechanism. It occurs, of course, when a particular trait confers reproductive advantage on those individuals who possess it. The third mechanism is sexual reproduction. Sex mixes the genes of a man and a woman after one half of the mixture has been discarded, which occurs during the pre-sexual mixing of genes from the maternal and paternal genomes when sperm and eggs are formed. This process of sexual recombination results in no child being an exact replica of either parent. A fourth mechanism responsible for genetically based differences between individuals is frequency-dependent selection, which is a sort of balancing mechanism such that some phenotypes are reproductively successful to the extent that they are relatively rare in the population. But there are limits to genetic diversity. Natural selection uses up somewhere between 70% and 85% of genetic variance.

Even though there are limits to genetic diversity, it does exist. One estimate is that 15% to 30% of human genes vary between any two individuals. Behavior genetics is the

research speciality that has been most interested in exploring the role of genetic diversity as a source of individual differences. Behavior geneticists who study human behavior have had to rely on the “natural experiments” of twinning and adoption. While each of the various research designs and analytic methods used by behavior geneticists has limitations, collectively they indicate hereditary influences for virtually all psychological traits. This is true for intelligence, academic achievement, personality, psychopathology, antisocial behavior, and so on.

Genes, of course, are not the whole story. Individuals differ not only in their genetic makeup but also in the environmental influences to which they have been exposed. The phenotype is a product of the mix of these two influences. Research with twins and adoptees allows us to estimate the relative importance of genes and environments as determinants of individual differences in psychological traits. Behavior genetics research has also alerted us to the importance of distinguishing between two classes of environmental influences. Some influences are consistent within a family. These are termed shared environments and include any experiences that are relatively uniform for all children within a family but different for children in another family. Examples would include parental personality traits, parental social attitudes, parenting style (to the degree that it is constant across siblings), religious beliefs, social class, and so on. But, of course, not all influences within families are shared. Parents may prefer one child over another. Major family events, such as divorce or parental loss, may occur for children at different ages. They may have different teachers. They usually have different friends. They, of course, have different birth orders. Experiences such as these are analyzed as nonshared environments.

When examining individual differences within cultures rather than the effects of different cultures, nonshared environmental experiences have generally been found to have a greater influence on psychological traits than do shared environmental influences. There are

several lessons to be drawn here. First, the concept of nonshared environments serves to remind us that the same environmental event can impact on different people differently, even within the same family. A second lesson is that families do matter, although their influence may be more limited than sometimes assumed. A third lesson is that the relative strength of genetic and environmental effects is trait- and population-specific. For example, differences in intelligence, more than personality, are influenced by shared environment, although heritability is greater in high socio-economic status (SES) families, and shared environment is more important in low-SES families. A fourth lesson is that it is necessary that we think of nonshared environments broadly. For example, environmental influences begin in utero. How well nourished a baby is prenatally may have long-term developmental consequences. The fifth lesson is that there are nonshared gene-environment relationships. Behavior geneticists typically look at gene-environment relationships as genetic effects, but it is also reasonable to examine them as environmental effects, and if we do, they are clearly nonshared effects. Gene-environment correlations occur when individuals with genotypes that have a particular effect tend to interact with environments that have similar effects. Gene-environment correlations draw our attention to the fact that we are active agents in our own development. By virtue of possessing certain genetically influenced traits, we may evoke, select, or modify the environments to which we are exposed. There is nothing too surprising here. Most people, given the chance, will spend more time doing that which they do best.

How all of this works out in an individual case can, of course, be quite complicated and multiply determined. For example, how a person expresses the personality traits of openness to experience and risk taking (both of which have significant heritability) will depend on the developmental context. These traits could be manifested in prosocial ways by becoming an astronaut, a downhill racer, or a venture capitalist. Alternatively, those same traits, as a result of quite different environmental and developmental circumstances, could be expressed through

antisocial behavior by becoming a thief, a con man, or a drug dealer.

In conclusion, I have sketched in broad strokes the importance of general theory in science and the significance of evolutionary theory for understanding the nature of human nature and individual development. The fruits of this endeavor are scattered throughout this book. For example, Flinn in Chapter 3 remarks that learning is not random, nor could it have evolved if it led to behaviors that were random with respect to adaptation. This does not mean that all behavior is adaptive. Some behavior may be historically and culturally specific. Yet even here, culturally unique behavior (e.g., scarification, or the practice of *purdah*) may lead to outcomes that are correlated with reproductive success in particular cultures (e.g., social status and paternity certainty). In this chapter, as well as in Chapter 4 by Geary, the importance of general intelligence (*g*) is emphasized as a domain-general mechanism facilitating survival and reproductive success in circumstances that vary across generations and lifetimes.

Oller and Griebel, in Chapter 5, discuss the evolution of language as part of a suite of adaptations that were selected because they increased the ability of dependent offspring to communicate their needs to caretakers. This was undoubtedly important throughout human evolution, not only because of child dependency and its unique length but also because of the uncertainty and contingent nature of parental investment (Hrdy, Ch. 6; Burgess & Draais-Parrillo, Ch. 11). For the same reasons, child sensitivity to parental cues (Hrdy, Ch. 6, LaFreniere, Ch. 7) would have been selected for, as would neoteny and hormonal priming, as mechanisms to encourage attachment and parental investment. Once in place, of course, language skills would become more sophisticated to deal with the complexity of social life as population expansion and density increased. In Chapter 8, MacDonald examines personality not just as a set of individual differences, but as an evolved emotional and motivational system. Other examples of the fruitfulness of an evolutionary perspective on development is evident in Krebs's (Ch. 9)

examination of moral judgments and moral behavior as adaptations to deal with the conflicts of interests endemic to living in social groups. Complying with rules of morality is most notable in kin relations and probably evolved therein. The connection between altruistic behavior and kin relations is seen in the ancient Arab proverb: "I against my brother, my brother and I against our cousin, my brother, my cousins and I against the world." Beyond kin-based altruism, moral behavior is often sustained through reciprocal altruism or exchange among non-kin and by coercion in more complex societies. In Chapter 8, MacDonald examines personality, not just as a set of individual differences, but as an evolved emotional and motivational system. Among the benefits for doing so, sex differences in personality traits and changes over the life span become more understandable. Chapter 11 illustrates how Tinbergen's four levels of analysis can be combined to provide a comprehensive explanation of child maltreatment. In Chapter 12, Weisfeld and Coleman gain added purchase on the nature of human adolescence by examining the importance of dominance striving, and the formation of romantic relationships and competition for mates during this stage of the life span.

These represent just a few examples of the insights provided by an evolutionary perspective. Each of the contributions to this book, separately and in concert, illustrates how far we have come in recognizing that despite all the individual differences we see around us, there is a common human nature, and the rules of survivorship and inclusive fitness ultimately govern the final outcome. This is seen once we recognize the similarity of individual differences around the world. Our fundamental human nature never departs very far from a golden mean.

Call for Abstracts

Christofer Edling and Charlotta Stern (both Stockholm university) are organizing a session at the 37th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology (ISS) in Stockholm, July 5 - 9, 2005. The title of the session is "Evolutionary Sociology," and we welcome theoretical, empirical, and experimental papers that focus on the evolution of social phenomena and social behavior. In particular, we seek theoretical papers utilizing game-theory or computer simulations and empirical studies and experimental approaches studying social evolution. The abstract submission deadline is November 30, 2004. If you would like to have an abstract considered, submit by email to Lotta.Stern@sofi.su.se.

A brief description of the congress is pasted below. More can be found at <http://www.scasss.uu.se/IIS2005/>.

Frontiers of Sociology The 37th World Congress of the International Institute of Sociology will be held in Stockholm on July 5-9, 2005

The Congress will allow social scientists from different parts of the world to exchange ideas and to establish long-term collaborative relationships. The plenary and semi-plenary sessions will focus on the frontiers of sociology. Some sessions will focus on cutting-edge research in sociology while others will focus on the relationship between sociology and its neighbouring disciplines. These sessions will include prominent representatives from a range of different disciplines such as anthropology, economics, history, law, political science, psychology, and statistics. . .

Call for papers: Evolutionary Psychology and Management

A special issue of *Managerial and Decision Economics* is to be devoted to the theme of Evolutionary Psychology and Management.

There has been an explosion of theory and research in evolutionary psychology in recent years, even since the last special issue of *Managerial and Decision Economics* devoted to this theme (Management, Organization and Human Nature, edited by Lívia Markóczy, November-December 1998). Since evolutionary psychology provides the most fundamental and ultimate explanations of human behavior in all domains, it has significant relevance to issues and topics in management and organizations, among others. The aim of this issue is to encourage and stimulate new applications of mainstream evolutionary psychological theory and research to management and managerial economics issues and topic. Accordingly, the guest editor particularly welcomes submissions from researchers who have not necessarily written in the area of management and organizations before.

All submitted articles will be refereed. Please submit three (3) hard copies by mail to:

Satoshi Kanazawa, Guest Editor
Interdisciplinary Institute of Management
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Science
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Potential contributors are encouraged to submit inquiries (but not articles) to the guest editor at: S.Kanazawa@lse.ac.uk.

Closing date for the receipt of papers: March 31, 2005.

International Society for Human Ethology

The International Society for Human Ethology was founded in 1972 to promote ethological perspectives in the study of humans worldwide. It encourages empirical research in all fields of human behavior using the full range of methods developed in biology and the human behavioral science and operating within the conceptual framework provided by evolutionary theory. Members represent a number of disciplines, including psychology, anthropology, sociology, and biology. The society meets every other summer, alternating between Europe and North America. The next congress will be at Wayne State University in Detroit around August 1, 2006. The society website is <http://evolution.anthro.univie.ac.at/ishe.html>. ISHE sponsors research by promising young investigators, and offers awards for outstanding work by young scholars. Members receive the quarterly Human Ethology Bulletin, which contains announcements, congress news, essays, book reviews, and lists of current literature. It is available free to students.

Annual dues (tax-deductible in the US) are \$US20 per year, \$50 for 3 years, or \$75 for 5 years (\$10/yr. or \$25 for 3 years for professors emeriti/-ae).

Students may request free 1-year membership by contacting the membership chair, Astrid Jutte: astrid.jutte@kli.ac.at. A free student membership entitles the student to an electronic version of the Bulletin sent by e-mail; to receive a printed version by postal mail, students must pay \$10/year.

New Publications of Section Members

Burgess, R. L., & MacDonald, K. 2004. *Evolutionary perspectives on human development*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Diekmann, Andreas and Kurt Schmidheiny. 2004. Do Parents of Girls Have a Higher Risk of Divorce? An Eighteen-Country Study. *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 66: 651-660. (Download: <http://www.socio.ethz.ch/de/diekmann/>)

Diekmann, Andreas, 2004: The Power of Reciprocity. Fairness, Reciprocity, and Stakes in Variants of the Dictator Game. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, 2004: 487-505. (Download: <http://www.socio.ethz.ch/de/diekmann/>)

Diekmann, Andreas and Peter Preisendoerfer, 2003. Green and Greenback. The Behavioral Effects of Environmental Attitudes in Low-Cost and High-Cost Situations. *Rationality and Society* 15: 441-472. (Download: <http://www.socio.ethz.ch/de/diekmann/>)

Diekmann, Andreas and David Wyder. 2002. Vertrauen und Reputation bei Internet-Auktionen („Trust and Reputation in Internet Auctions“). *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 54: 674-693. (Download: <http://www.socio.ethz.ch/de/diekmann/>)

Diekmann, Andreas and Thomas Voss, Eds., 2004. Rational-Choice-Theorie in den Sozialwissenschaften. Anwendungen und Probleme (“Rational-Choice Theory in the Social Sciences. Problems and Applications”). Festschrift for Rolf Ziegler. Munich: Oldenbourg (in German).

Hopcroft, Rosemary L. 2005. “Parental status and differential investment in sons and daughters: Trivers-Willard revisited.” *Social Forces*. Forthcoming in March.

Paul Kamolnick (forthcoming summer 2005). *The Just Meritocracy: IQ, Class Mobility, and American Social Policy* (Westport, CT: Praeger).

Joining the section:

New members can join the *Evolution and Sociology* Section using the webpage of the ASA

Info on new section on line:

<http://www.asanet.org/governance/evolution.html>

To join ASA (pdf form):

<http://www.asanet.org/forms/membapp.pdf>

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<http://www.asanet.org/forms/sectionform.html>

"The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost a greater benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error."

John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, 1859