

Immigrant Political Voice in a Comparative Perspective

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Abstract

Why are Muslim immigrants in Europe commonly perceived as contentious, while Latino immigrants in the United States are often perceived as passive? What explains these different perceptions? This project uses surveys and multi-sited ethnography to study the avenues for political voice and integration of immigrants. It takes into account the role of the sending community in individual meaning-making, as well as the socialization and institutional practices of the receiving community. The transnational circuit of Mexico-New York is compared with those of North Africa-Paris, and Morocco-Barcelona. The results point to the importance of the state in creating perceptions of belonging and exclusion and how they get translated into different forms of contentious politics and everyday citizenship.

Research Questions

What are the avenues that immigrant groups have in order to voice their needs and grievances in different democracies? Why are Muslim immigrants in Europe perceived as contentious and Latino immigrants in the United States as passive? Is this empirically true? How can we explain these perceptions in a systematic way, that goes beyond stereotypes about “the radicalization of Islam” or “the humility of Mexican workers”, and that tells us something about the effects of institutional practices, public debates, and everyday interactions in the receiving countries? What role do religious views play in drawing real and imagined boundaries between immigrants and locals? How do citizenship regimes shape the political identities of immigrants and their participation in

collective protest? How does contention between hosts and newcomers arise? Under which categories do immigrants engage in collective action? These are important questions that have rarely been studied empirically or in a comparative perspective.

This project provides an interactive approach to the relations between immigrants and their social environments both at the sending and receiving ends, to discover what factors explain the immigrant groups' preferred mode of collective action and claim-making *vis à vis* the receiving state. This project describes the local implications derived from national immigration policies and citizenship regimes on the social life of immigrant groups.

This project studies immigrant communities in France (Paris) and Spain (Barcelona) and compares them with immigrant communities in the United States (New York). A series of interviews were conducted at the receiving and sending communities in order to gather original data on 1) the reasons and characteristics of migration flows from Mexico, Algeria and Morocco, as well as 2) how immigrants solve their daily problems (access to jobs, education, healthcare, negotiation with the law, etc.) including who they go to when in need, and the kinds of interactions they have with various local authorities; 3) relations with other groups, and their perceptions of boundaries, differences, and commonalities; 4) how national policies and citizenship regimes impact daily life situations. The data from these interviews illuminates how larger policies and citizenship regimes affect specific localities and everyday interactions between groups. The aim of this project is to understand the mechanisms of how citizenship regimes shape and are shaped by the local processes observed and reported by informants, interviewees, local experts, the media and secondary sources.

The comparative design is meant to control for, and problematize, two very common but also too "easy" explanations: a) that the culture of the immigrants alone explains their social position and the manner in which they voice their claims, regardless of the social, political, and economic context in which they are embedded; b) that the general political culture of the receiving state, its citizenship regime, immigration legislation, and the preferred mode of incorporation totally determine immigrant integration and political participation without the mediation of institutions and local actors.

This project elaborates an alternative and more complex interactive model which looks at:

- I. The context of emigration in the sending country, including whether and how relations are maintained between emigrant communities and communities "back home";
- II. The context of incorporation, both by formal state channels, but also by what I call "de-facto citizenship", including interactions with local authorities, schools, clinics, unions, social workers, the police, etc;
- III. The relations with other groups in the host society, such as other minorities, and other immigrants groups; and
- IV. The dynamic interaction between immigrant characteristics and state policies in the context of all the factors mentioned above.

The contentious politics of immigrant vary across regimes. Examples of some visible cases are the riots in the French *banlieues* in 2005; the "Day without Immigrants" marches on May 1st 2006 in the United States; and the riots in El Ejido, Spain in 2000 (see Calavita 2005; Majuelos 2000). These contentious events show instances when cohabitation and the negotiation of implicit consent are disrupted by the perception of intolerable abuses and the voicing of claims. In all these events, the actors were reacting to a perceived attack from members across a categorical boundary, which in the process

became more salient, and which was further reinforced following these events (for an example of these dynamics and their stakes see Roy 1994).

Boundary Making and Inequality

Despite claims by proponents of post-national citizenship (e.g. Soysal 1994), the nation-state still matters, especially in the way immigrants may be welcomed, or not, into a polity. Internal migration, migration from developed countries, or the migration of professionals, scholars and scientists is not problematized in the same way as labor migration from poor to rich countries is. While historical cases of rural to urban migration caused alarm among state officials and parts of the bourgeois society due to the appearance of “social problems” such as poverty, slums and unhealthy conditions, these concerns were magnified by the presence of immigrants (Ward 1989). While migration regulation used to be an issue dealt with at the ports of entry (Zolberg 2006), in the last decades international low-skilled labor migration has been discouraged by national laws that have created the categories of “legal” and “illegal” migrants (for the tautology and reproduction of the illegal condition see Calavita 2005; Lucassen 2005; Ngai 2004; Zolberg 2006). In this context, most of the international migrants lacking visas and permits live in a subordinate and disadvantaged position in the host society. They come, nonetheless, due to colonial and trade links, family networks, and cultures of migration (Cohen 2004, Sayad 2004). The pay undocumented migrants receive is normally lower than that which would be awarded to local workers. Employers and employees justify this pay-differential because of the immigrants’ status as unauthorized workers and immigrants initially consent because of the lower wages in the country of origin. Migrants often accept a low position in the social order at the country of destination

because by doing so, they increase their status at the sending country. Furthermore, migrants accept their subordinate status in the host society because they see it as a temporal situation before they become legalized, leave voluntarily or are deported. This is specially the case amongst New Mexican immigrants in New York City. Thus unequal relations between natives and immigrants are based on legal distinctions, segmented markets, stigmatization, social boundaries, surveillance and policing (Schneider 2008).

Collective action is contingent upon opportunity structures that allow immigrants to question existing power relations and change categorical understandings. The questioning and reconfiguration of social boundaries problematizes these unequal power relations. So, while at times immigrants consent to their exploitation, other times they engage in protests, and contentious politics. This was the case with the large pro-immigrant marches of 2006 in the U.S; and with the *Marches des Beurs* in France in 1983. But most often the contestation against exclusion happens in everyday arenas.

This project looks at mechanisms that result in the political exclusion and inclusion of immigrants in three democratic, developed nations the United States, France, and Spain. Conversations and interviews with hosts and immigrant communities are required in order to understand when and how social boundaries between immigrant groups and hosts appear, and the consequences of the resulting categorizations in the creation of political inequality (Lamont 2000; Tilly 2005). As Rogers Brubaker writes, “From a distance, it is all too easy to “see” bounded and homogenous ethnic and national groups, to whom common interests, perceptions, intentions, and volition can be attributed”; therefore, there is a need to look at these groups up-close, while keeping in mind larger social structures that shape local understandings (Brubaker 2006:xiv). This project looks

at how political participation is affected by different citizenship regimes and national conceptions, focusing on three contentious events as perceived and understood by local groups. This project draws on the literature on citizenship, nationalism, immigration, categorical inequality, social boundaries, and contentious politics (Tilly and Tarrow 2007) and materials published in English, French, and Spanish.

Working Hypotheses on Citizenship Regimes and Political Life

France

In France, since the revolution of 1789, the normative concepts of popular-sovereignty and secularism (*laïcité*) aim to create a unified republic. The state actively proposes, and enforces, a common civil culture to bring unity to a diverse set of peoples into one nation. This feeling is exemplified by Durkheim's call for a common civil culture and a shared love of the French Republic that would substitute local, religious, and family ties, for feelings of solidarity, social cohesion, and order across atomized individuals in an increasingly industrialized and urban France (Durkheim 1893).

The French model is a "republican citizenship regime" (see Peled 1992; Peled and Shafir 1996 in Lainer-Vos 2006). The French Republican ideal is to forge a strong and unified nation-state out of different fragments and diverse subjects. This came to happen historically; the process was long, but a perceived unity was created (Weber 1976). This model of a supposedly culturally homogenous nation-state has been copied abroad and legitimized due to its framed-connection to the liberal ideas of democracy, liberty, equality and universal human rights. Nonetheless, what resulted in France was not a neutral egalitarian society but one in which the values of the Parisian elite became

dominant (Bourdieu 1996), and while aiming to achieve secularism, the implicit religion of the state is Catholicism (or in a broader sense Christianity, leaving behind the old “irresolvable” feuds between Catholics and Protestants). The belief in a common origin, cultural homogeneity and equal rights is strong among most parts of French society. Therefore, the arrival of observant Muslims, who may use folk clothing, headscarves, and other religious iconography used also as identity markers and cultural artifacts, is seen as an important affront to the French polity, which, in order to keep its perceived homogeneity and power relations intact, imposes a strong “assimilation program” to its immigrants. However, as the events in “the burning *banlieues*” show, many of the arriving migrants and their children are not completely happy with this strong imposition, the large integration expectations, which would require them to change who they are, in order to be accepted as French. At the same time that employment access is not the same for individuals who may show phenotypical “Arab characteristics.”

In this context religious and racial differences create fault lines. As a French railway technician in Clichy, France told Sociologist Michèle Lamont, “We have to be honest. The problem is that North African immigrants don’t have the same education, the same values as we do. We have a general Christian education that regulates our relationships. But in the Muslim world, the Koran does not have the same values at all...” (2000:6). Here the interviewee starts from an abstract categorization about different values in order to express his general dislike for Muslim immigrants. Many of my informants expressed similar views.

The extreme right has capitalized on these perceptions, through the National Front party and its perennial presidential candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen for whom immigration is

the cause of all problems.¹ From a different political position François Bayrou, another presidential hopeful, expresses a very statist view, when he expresses that a solution to the problems in the *banlieues* is a stronger state presence. While he admits that France should go beyond formal equality in paper to a real equality (*égalité réelle*) pointing to the contradictions in the French model; he then proposes as a solution that French Muslim Imams should study theology in French universities in order to put a laic twist, and tacitly make Islam more compatible with French values! (Talk at Sciences Po 1/2/2007 available at <http://www.bayrou.fr/>). The political and theoretical discourse of Bayrou shows how engrained are the republican, secular ideals in the *habitus* of the French elite.²

The Republican ideal of Durkheim and others is still very relevant today. The State and the Parisian cultural and intellectual elites have a very strong influence on what it means to be French, leaving very little room, and symbolic power, for those deviating from the norm [including the temporal residence of this non-French author]. Unfortunately, for many French nationals this ideology is so embedded, that it becomes unconscious, part of their habitus, in a way that it is hard for them to take distance from this world-view. Interviews with immigrants and some of their descendants show the psychological toll imposed by this strong acculturation logic but the French model has few constructive avenues for this difference to be channeled.

The United States

¹ In the French Presidential race of 2007, candidate François Bayrou warned against the simplification of the migrant problematic criticizing Le Pen for believing that “there is but a cause for all problems: immigration;” «à toutes les problématiques, il n’y a qu’une seule cause: l’immigration» (Talk at Sciences Po February 1st, 2007).

² Furthermore, it is important to note that in 1978 the French government prohibited the collection of ethnic and racial data on its population (Lamont 2000:317). Emmanuelle Saada notes that this practice goes back to the colonial days in the Caribbean (cited in Lamont 2000).

After the end of a “melting pot model,” which strongly emphasized integration, the United States has normally been presented as the prototypical example of “the liberal citizenship regime” (Peled 1992). In the U.S., immigrants are allowed to keep their cultural practices, and integration happens gradually through generations; ethnicity does not preclude citizenship. While not being as open as the Canadian society, the United States is still very close to the multicultural model, even if after 9/11 this model faced much criticism. Many generations of Americans have now been transformed by the legacy of the civil rights movement and the cultural practice of political correctness which bans openly racist speech. Racial inequality is reproduced mainly through historical legacies and structural arrangements that result in durable inequalities (Tilly, 1998; Massey 2007). Nonetheless, there has been a social mobilization from the right, and the populist left, producing a new wave of nativism at the national level (although this may be the reflection of internal ideological struggles rather than purely xenophobic outlets see: (Castañeda 2006)). Some argue that these nativist anti-immigrant attacks are creating a reaction-formation (Portes 2007), that by being signaled as different, Latinos (regardless of their nationality or legal status) will look to differentiate from the mainstream society as a defense mechanism. The result of the racialization of Mexicans in New York is still to be seen but if avenues for education and higher paying jobs are not open for men and women the future of this group is uncertain (Smith 2006).

Spain

In contrast to the American model, the Spanish national identity is highly parochial, partly since it was formed in reaction to the exclusion of the Moorish, Jewish, and colonized indigenous peoples in the 1400’s. Spanish distrust foreigners to different

degrees as expressed in this comment from a person in Almería, Spain³, “Look, nobody would want to have immigrants as their neighbors...one would always prefer Spaniards...but if you had a choice, better they be Latin Americans, who are more like us, or black Africans, who are good people, better than Moroccans or Algerians who are the dirtiest and most problematic...this is not just my opinion, it’s the facts” (quoted in Calavita 2005:127). In this phrase we see how a broad and unfair generalization is taken as common sense or a “social fact” due to its widespread currency inside the informants’ social network.

While older generations were shaped by Franco’s strong republican and ethno-national discourse emphasizing the Spanish as a common people against communists and outside influences; the younger generations are more tolerant and have a high participation in civil society’s efforts to embrace immigrants (e.g. Acoge, SOS Racismo).

The surveys show that despite what could be seen as repeated openly racist statements from the Spanish, Moroccans are quite at ease in Spain. They feel happy to be there and like it very much. They work hard, and they hope their children will profit from being raised and educated in Spain. This was also the case where the young male immigrants had the highest rate of contact with locals, and where we recorded many cases of many recently-arrived Moroccans dating local women. This shows that Spain, Barcelona and even more so Madrid, are quite open to new foreigner arrivals as I will demonstrate later.

Commonalities across Cases

Immigrants often internalize the public discourse and media discussion about their arrival in the host society. Talking with a group of Mexican immigrants in Queens, New

³ Southern Spanish province where El Ejido is located.

York after a basketball game (summer of 2005) I noticed how they made fun of each other, marking their worth based on their legal status. One would tell me, pointing to his cousin, “that one is a *pinche* illegal.” Thus the ones who were citizens took pride in their status and felt superior to their illegal compatriots and made fun of them, even when their paper regularization may have happened as a result of a policy change outside of their control. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note how immigrants themselves internalize and reinforce symbolic boundaries, despite the fact that they are friends from the same town, with common acquaintances, and from the same socio-economic background.

While immigrants internalize citizenship regimes, the exclusive nature of these regimes may make them organize to engage in protests and other political displays, often forming alliances with local activists and members of the second generation, who tend to be more “culturally literate” and familiar with the rights discourses of the receiving society, more “integrated” and more “politicized”. These social movements may highlight the injustices and inequalities in opportunities and income which are perceived as a lack of social rights. While, in general, the first generation of immigrants will be busy working and getting adjusted to the new system (Hellman 2008), the second generation, being used to the benefits and ideas of the host society, will tend to be more vocal about the abuses and negative experiences that their parents or co-ethnics face.

In the same way, the state may react to popular protest for migrant rights in a way that alters the nature of the citizenship regime. For example, after the use of Mexican flags in the immigrants’ rights marches of May 1st 2006, many observers in the right and centrist media, and even some organizers, pointed towards the divisive nature of this action. This response underlines a further sacralization of the American flag, and the underlining of

the importance of unity, homogeneity and ideological similarity, more like the French Republican model. This may represent the move of the American polity towards a more republican attitude after 9/11.

At the same time, as a reaction of the events of 2005 in France, many observers noted that the French “integrationist” secular model was not going according to theory, and that a more multicultural and tolerant model was necessary (e.g. NYT Tuesday, November 8, 2005), if these suggestions were put into effect this would move the citizenship regime closer to the liberal American model. For example, Sciences-Po has started a modest “affirmative-action-type” of program (more on this later).

Differences

The United States has often portrayed itself as country of immigrants, especially after the 1960's (Gabaccia 2008). The United States is an example of a “nation by design” made out of different immigrant groups. But according to Aristide Zolberg (2006) the state's implicit and/or direct immigrant control was used as a nation-building tool. He further notes that the U.S. declared itself as no longer a country of immigrants as early as 1930 (2006:9), so the recurrent nativist movements are not been so “abnormal” since the U.S. has previously been successful in promoting a common ethno-national and ideological identity.

On the other side people tend to underemphasize the immigrant nature of France and Spain, although both were populated by a large number of ethnic groups (see Calavita 2005; Hoerder and Moch 1996; (Noiriel 2001)). Not only European countries have been receptors of immigrants but also senders. Large European emigrations include the large colonizing missions after the discovery of the Americas, and an even larger wave of 52

million who left Europe between 1824 and 1924 (Hoerder and Moch 1996:3).⁴ Contrary to popular belief, European emigration is not a thing of the past. For example, there are more than 300,000 French citizens living in England today (The Economist 2/1/2007), and there is also a considerable number of French academics and professionals living in the United States 151,155 French-born people were living in the U.S. according to the 2000 U.S. census, with yearly enrolments of a little over 500 French nationals pursuing their Ph.D. in the U.S., and around 1,000 post-docs. There were 31,400 permanent residents born in France living in the US (NSF 2000).

Relevance

Groups at the both extremes of the public debate around immigration often exaggerate their statements, present distorted views of immigrant life, and rarely deploy objective, empirical information because of the intrinsic political and normative nature of their agendas. A formal understanding of real life processes of migration, incorporation and political participation across different contexts can lead to a better understanding about the cohabitation of different groups that emerges not from a purely normative framework but from everyday interactions that can be gathered from empirical work that takes into account existing limitations, political opportunities, and incentive structures of real world migrants. A contextual study of the social processes and mechanisms of emigration, immigration and inter-group relations is needed to understand group formation, us/them distinctions, boundary making, and categorical inequality (Tilly 1998) among hosts and immigrants on the ground.

⁴ Indeed, France was one the only European country with a net immigration rate in the period of 1850-1940 (Schnapper 1991:64 quoted in Lamont 317: fn. 24).

Secondary literature, multi-sited fieldwork, participant observation, and in-depth interviews with experts, and key actors, as well as host and immigrant groups in different countries aids this attempt to formulate a theory to understand the cyclical appearance of heated debates and confrontations around immigration.

Relevant Literature

New immigrant groups are often portrayed by both classic liberal political theory (Beiner 2003) and anti-immigrant voices (Buchanan 2006; Huntington 2004) as an unfair burden for citizens and the welfare state; and as a threat to national unity, democratic participation, and rational debate in the public sphere because of differences in language, religion or civic culture. These claims, and the resulting policy demands and legislative acts (Hollifield 2000:146), are sometimes uncontested, while other times they are followed by rebuttals, protests, and legal challenges from pro-immigrant groups, intellectuals and immigrants themselves through spokes-people or organized groups. When this voicing occurs, immigrant groups are able to actively shape the political agenda-setting of a nation-state, regardless of the citizenship status of their members. Even if they rarely have direct control over the decision-making regarding their collective claims and legal status, the fact that migrants engage in claim-making vis-à-vis the state and that they impact the public agenda-setting, constitutes them as *de facto* political actors. Understanding how this agenda-setting works can shed light on a crucial, yet understudied process, about the actual functioning of the public sphere. There are few comparative empirical studies on how immigrant groups access and shape public debate (Soysal 1994; Weil 2005). Furthermore, lately the literature has recognized how

emigrants also may shape the polity and public debates in the country of origin (Sassen 2006).

Habermas (1989) and many others assume formal membership through citizenship as a necessary condition in order to make claims in the public sphere, which is generally bounded by the nation state (Calhoun 1992). Habermas (1998) addresses the issues of immigration, and difference but not in relation to the access of non-citizens to the public sphere but in relation to citizenship and refugee legislation. Nevertheless, in reality non-citizens engage in everyday collective action in the form of community organizations, advocacy, lobbying, or in news-making events such as the large marches for immigrant rights in the U.S. in the spring of 2006, and even if to a lesser extent the two following years; the Chicano movement of the 1960's; the protests in the *banlieues* of Paris and elsewhere in 2005, or the "Marche des Beurs" of 1983 in France where the children of immigrants from the Maghreb marched to Paris to defend their rights.

While much of the literature discusses citizenship as top-down attribute handed by the state, this study will also look at bottom-up mechanisms that help or inhibit cohabitation and integration and shape claim-making and political behavior. Legal and exclusionary views of citizenship frame new immigrants as *de jure* "being" outside of the polity even while *de facto* these groups live *in* it. This framing has the functional characteristic of allowing categorical inequality, opportunity hoarding and exploitation of new immigrants by the host society and older immigrants (Tilly 1998; Mahler 1995). If we take this legalistic exclusion at face value or as ontological, we will reproduce the confusion often found in political theory which reinforces, reproduces and justifies these boundaries.⁵ At

⁵ For more on the reification of folk categories by social science see Rogers Brubaker (2006:10).

the same time, a mere denunciation of these practices and concepts will not make these categorizing processes go away.

One could look at a *de facto* citizenship, understood as political membership and cohabitation in a diverse nation. In this regard, the literature on multiculturalism tries to do away with the imperative of cultural similarity but it fails to look seriously at issues of contention, exclusion, boundary making and categorization because it often has an *a priori* normative commitment to tolerance and cohabitation (Kymlicka 1995) that obscures empirical mechanisms of contention and collective action to fight for inclusion/exclusion within a political community. In the same way, much of the literature on cosmopolitanism, international law, universal human rights and post-national citizenship (Soysal 1994) fails to take enough into account state practices of deportation, border militarization (Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Nevins 2002), and policing of immigrants (Schneider Forthcoming). On the other side, some react to popular rights-based claim-making by arguing the sovereignty of the state to control its borders, and put the blame on the sending states claiming that emigration functions as an escape valve for political and economic problems, arguing that sometimes migrants may have a louder voice in the receiving society than they had in their place of origin (De la Garza 2000; Fitzgerald 2005; Hirschman 1970). But besides the degree of veracity of these claims, the question of immigrant inclusion remains.

In a normative sense, citizenship is the way to guarantee an equal access to civil, political and social rights (Marshall 1964). Liberal theory commonly relates citizenship with homogeneity or equality in an ontological sense by claims of common racial origin (*jus sanguinis*), or birth in a common land (*jus soli*) (Brubaker 1992), or through cultural

and civil homogenization to be acquired through assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Durkheim 1893). In some cases the inability to gain citizenship may keep some groups in the margins, as in the case of Turkish people in Germany (Brubaker 1992) at least before the citizenship reform of 1999. But as it may be the case of Algerians in France, access to citizenship may not necessarily guarantee total equality, integration or social mobility (Brubaker 1992). Furthermore, there is an important legalistic difference between aliens, residents and citizens, or states-in-between, in the American case, or between *nationalité* and *citoyenneté* in the French case. In the case of *nationalité*, belonging, cultural affinity, or legal entitlements are recognized but voting rights are not provided (Saada 2005).

Stratified Citizenship

For all these reasons, I will not use the concept of citizenship in a binary way, of all or nothing, as a proxy to describe the political inclusion or exclusion of immigrants into their society of destination, since the concept of citizenship cannot always describe adequately collective access to the political system, upward mobility, cultural rights or general wellbeing (Portes and Rumbaut 2001). While legalistic or normative conceptions of citizenship are not very productive empirically, I will use a notion of citizenship as "a conceptual variable" as Nettl (1968) does with the concept of the state. Nettl argues that the concept of the state means different things in the United States, France, England, and in the developing world, but instead of getting rid of this concept altogether, looking precisely at what makes these cases different can teach us much about the nature of these societies. In the same manner, in practice citizenship, understood as political participation and legal entitlements, is not total or null (1 or 0) but gradated. Understanding how it

varies can teach us much about the effect of different societal and institutional arrangements. Furthermore, it is a fallacy to say that a state can respond equally to all individuals or even groups in terms of provision, attention and representation since there is a practical impossibility to deliver exactly the same quality of services to all segments of the population partly because of their different needs and characteristics. In practice, citizenship is necessarily a flexible term depending on the context. Beyond legal definitions, citizenship is an implicit relational contract based on trust and reciprocity, which can therefore cause indignation and repercussions when unfulfilled (Tilly 1996). The French citizens of Algerian descent have much to teach us in this regard as we will discover later on.

Within-Group Differences

Because of legalistic differentiating mechanisms (Calavita 2005; Ngai 2004), individuals among certain immigrant group may be recognized as citizens by the receiving state while others are not. In spite of legal residence or citizenship, individuals may be categorized and treated as if they were non-citizens if they are perceived by the majority group as members of a different ethnic group, as in the case of Muslims in France. Also American citizens of Latin American origin are sometimes treated as undocumented immigrants, e.g. by border-patrol agents, but unlike non-citizens they can sue and ask for reparations for being discriminated against (for a case in matter see Archibold 2006). But these retributions do not destroy categorical boundaries. Differences amongst members of a categorical group in terms of legal entitlements assigned through state-citizenship, means that some members of a given categorical group can become invested in the *status quo* either because they perceive the existing

categorization as legitimate or because they have a better position than others from a similar background (Mahler 1995), thus legitimizing forms of exclusion that may partially benefit them (Tilly 1998; Bourdieu 1991; Porters and Rumbaut 2006). This leads us to a concept of stratified citizenship as developed by Peled (1992) who claims that while Arab citizens of Israel do not have the same status as Jewish citizens, they still have more political voice than non-citizens. As Peled puts it, “Israel’s Arab citizens are by no means satisfied with the place accorded to them in Israel’s political system (...) However, the limited, liberal citizenship status they enjoy has endowed them with sufficient rights and privileges to both enable and induce them to conduct their struggle within the constitutional framework of the state, rather that (sic) against it. This has been a key factor in allowing Israel to maintain a stable democratic regime in the context of an acute ethnic conflict” (Peled 1992:440). Peled claims that this still holds after the start of the first Intifada in 1987 since most contention comes from non-citizens. This analysis of stratified citizenship, where rights differ for different groups and subgroups, illustrates how differences in legal status among ethnic minorities and non-citizens can affect political incorporation and avenues of political voice.

Segmented Assimilation

In the same manner that citizenship as a concept cannot be null or total, “assimilation” does not have to mean cultural literacy in only one culture (Zolberg 1999). As Portes and Rumbaut (2006) show, it is the immigrants who are more engaged in transnational politics and in issues in their country of origin, who later become the most involved in political participation in the host-society. Portes and Rumbaut (2001) propose the concept of **segmented assimilation** to account for different pathways of acculturation

depending on reception practices. Among other groups, Portes and Rumbaut compare the prospects for social mobility of Cubans, who gain legal residency immediately when they arrive in U.S. soil, with many Mexican immigrants, who face many barriers to obtain legal residency. This has repercussions for their integration in certain sectors of the labor market and for the stratification of later generations as well as in leading to different pathways for claim-making.

While there are some comparative studies on immigration, citizenship, assimilation and economic mobility (Hoerder and Moch 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Reitz 2003; Lucassen 2005; Calavita 2005; and others), and there is even some literature on comparative political integration (Alba and Foner 2009) there is not enough comparative research on how non-citizen residents access and participate in the public sphere of the receiving country, or on how immigrant groups behave politically when their members lack voting rights (exceptions are Giugni and colleagues 2004). This project will look at the specific processes and mechanisms that construct differences between groups, and the dynamics that may favor different types of political voice and claim-making.

Categorization

As Brubaker (2004) proposes, ethnicity is a contingent form of political participation that is socially constructed under specific historical circumstances, in the same way coordinated collective action based on country of origin is contingent. For example, given important regional differences, certain conditions are needed for someone from Southern Mexico (e.g. a Mixtec indigenous person from Guerrero) to find common cause with someone from Central or Northern Mexico (e.g. someone from Jalisco with “European” features). Important salient divisions among co-nationals could be region, dialect, class,

gender, or perceived race. But if the host regime places them in the same category, which can result in real consequences such as deportation, racial profiling, etc.; these individuals may perceive a common threat. After these processes occur it is more likely that they will engage in coordinated action under a common collective self-identification (Hadden and Tarrow 2007; Roy 1994). In many circumstances nationalism is “reactive” in that it forms in relation to an “Other”; historically members of a town or locality inside a weak nation-state only identified as members of that nation after their arrival into another society which lumped them together, actively tried to convert them into citizens, or questioned their loyalties in times of war (Anderson 1983, Daniels 2004; Massey 2007; McAdam et al. 2001; A. Marx 2003 in Zelizer and Tilly 2007; Weber 1976). In this sense it would be interesting to analyze how the findings on the behavior of immigrant groups may or may not be different from the predictions by work on nationalism, citizen-social movements, and identity politics.

Categories and political identities can change through time as the social ecology changes. As the result of coalition formation and classificatory struggles, national categorizations may be superseded by newer ones such as “Latino” or “Arab” pan-categories, in integration process changing groups “from immigrants to ethnics” (Hoerder 1996; Portes and Rumbaut 2006:V).

The Creation of Difference and Similarity

A preliminary theory would state that the larger the degree of “similarity” of an immigrant group to a host society along a characteristic deemed as necessary to establish equivalence and worth (Boltanski and Thevenot 1999) such as language, religion, physical appearance, or any other condition that is constructed as socially meaningful,

the less opposition it will face (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Putnam 2007; Rumbaut and Portes 2001); For example in the present day, Canadians in America; Belgians in France; Mexicans in Spain. The size of the immigrant inflow would also be important in attracting attention; this is why looking at “atypical” immigrant groups is also important. Normally, the more visible and intrusive an immigrant group is framed or perceived to be, the more negative reactions it will face (Portes and Rumbaut 2006; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001). Interestingly, this opposition may create a dialectical response. Analyzing the criminalization and policing of undocumented immigrants in New York and the *sans-papiers* in France, Cathy Schneider proposes that, the greater “the reinforcement of racial/ethnic or religious boundaries paradoxically increases the likelihood of mobilization against such boundaries” (Schneider forthcoming). Thus the likelihood for collective action based on self-identification around a common place of origin will be partly a function of visible opposition by sectors of the host society based on underlined differences. It is important to notice that these differences are not innate but result from a classificatory struggle determined by the history of the relationship between places of origin and destiny, economic conditions, political opportunism, and categorical struggles. For example, Mexicans in the U.S. have been framed as problematic around times of economic crisis in California in the 1930’s and then again in the 1990’s, similar processes have taken place in other states (Almaguer 1994; Daniels 2004; Fox 2006).

The larger the perceived and constructed differences, the larger the opposition to immigration and incorporation, and the higher the likelihood of creation of social boundaries and self-identifications based on culture and place of origin. The more vocal

the opposition, the more vocal the pro-immigrant groups will be (McAdam et al 2001). In this self-reinforcing mechanism, the extremes will tend to dominate the debate in the public sphere with the potential to polarize or alienate the general public, as well as internal members inside each categorical group with moderate views or different sets of legal attributes or privileges (Peled 1992). Since multiple interests co-exist in both pro and anti-migration camps, there will likely be important disagreements and different strategies espoused within immigrant and host groups (Castañeda 2007).

The media portrayal of immigrants is likely to be a factor in the construction of new social boundaries (Chavez 2001). The success of the claim-making camps will depend in part on their ability to construct bridges to institutionally influential actors, to control the terms of the debate and, to an extent, influence the academic research-agenda regarding the issues in question (Brubaker 2004). Public intellectuals, academics, and opinion leaders are strategic in moderating different sides, shaping the debate, creating new categorizations, and influencing policy makers.

Historical legacies and relations also affect the dynamics of incorporation. Institutional settings matter as well, a federal system, like the United States, will offer different niches for immigrant claim-making which can target the local level, while a centralized system, like France, will make immigrant groups target bureaucracies and politicians in the capital (Kriesi 1995).

Multisite Fieldwork for the Inter-regional Comparison of Immigrant Claim-Making


The surveys, interviews, and multi-sited fieldwork test and refine all these preliminary hypotheses and theories by looking carefully at a number of empirical cases. Furthermore, this project disentangles causation between the intrinsic differences of distinct migratory flows and the social and institutional mechanisms of reception, and account for in-group differences. In contrast to regression models that look only for the significant effects of few variables, detailed case studies informed by comparative fieldwork allow the researcher to describe the processes of boundary formation and claim-making in different settings to test their replicability. This project documents specific mechanisms and processes that lead to different types of political voice and participation within different historical, institutional and cultural contexts. This project describes the interaction between agenda-setting in public policy debates around migration issues, and the claim-making and political organization of immigrant groups and organizations. This project will propose general mechanisms and processes of contentious politics that are generalizable among different cases without proposing universal laws that ignore local contexts and peculiarities (McAdam 2001; Tilly 2003).

The following methodology section, discusses the reasons to compare these three states. At the end the reader will better understand the contexts that explain visible events such as the riots in the French *banlieues* in 2005; the “Day without Immigrants” marches on May 1st 2006 in the United States; and the riots in El Ejido, Spain in 2000.

This project compares claim-making, that is the channels available to specific immigrant groups to voice collective claims and demands, in a specific event in the United States, France and Spain. In order to do the following chapters will provide a background on the historical, political and social contexts shaping each flow, and the

differences between the first and second generations in each of these cases (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Rumbaut and Portes 2001); and will take into account the differences within each immigrant group and between different places of origin and destiny. And it incorporates material which is not available in English.

A set of general mechanisms explaining the formal relation between immigration, incorporation and political participation can only emerge from an in-depth comparative case study; one with a limited number of cases in order to obtain enough information about the specificity of each case, yet with cases being different enough to be able to make generalizations that go beyond the singularities of a case (Stinchcombe 2005). The different forms of incorporation between and among immigrant groups provides important information about how and when political organization and collective action take place, and when they are not seen as necessary or feasible. When necessary I will also mention comparisons to the life of Muslims in American and of the Mexican community in France. Yet the emphasis will be on Mexico-U.S. migration, Algeria-France migrations which are mayor flows, using Spain as a site to compare both, within a context where neither Mexicans nor Algerians dominate the public imagination about the stereotypical immigrant groups.



Transnational Paths

This project makes a fresh and original comparison between Mexican immigrants in the U.S. (Alba and Nee 2003; Almaguer 1994; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Smith and Morán Quiroz 2006), following previous work by the author on migration from Guerrero to New York (Castañeda-Tinoco 2006) with the work on Algerians and their migration to France by early Pierre Bourdieu (1962 [1958]), Abdelmalek Sayad (2004), and many others. Each case has an interesting and important body of academic literature; unfortunately the findings and theories proposed for each migratory circuit have not been fully or systematically compared thus preventing beneficial cross-pollinations. This project benefits from a systematic comparison of these two cases, as well as from a third case: Spain, where both Mexicans and Algerians migrate in discrete numbers. Which raises the question of why migration of Mexicans and Algerians to Spain is not larger? Are the lack of social networks and migratory tradition enough to explain this?

The Spanish case will allow the study of Algerians in a different European country of which they were not a previous colony and whose language they do not share, as well as Mexican immigrants who share language and religion with the Spanish. Looking at Algerian migration into Spain allows the study of the political voice of this group in a different context where they are less visible but also more “dissimilar” in a context-specific manner (Boltanski 1999). Comparing these migratory flows can illuminate the processes leading to the criminalization of immigration, and the militarization of borders which are only partly explained by security concerns after 9/11 and other terrorist attacks. The popular view of the United States as “a country of immigrants” should make it easier down the line for immigrant groups to merge with the receiving society compared to Arabs in European nominally Christian countries who are not as used to immigration

since, despite historical reality (Weil 2002; Noiriel 1992), in the popular imagination, the Europeans passed from being emigrants and colonizers into being the hosts of people from former colonies and other continents. The common thought would be that Algerians, or Moroccans, being Arabic have a harder time in European countries than Mexicans in the United States since they are Christians. But how can we compare these flows and immigrant experiences besides hypothesis around the importance of religious affiliation? The attitude towards immigrants is an empirical question that should not be answered by these broad comparisons a priori without talking to migrants themselves.

Ethnographic fieldwork, interviews and participant observation among migrant groups is crucial to collect context-rich qualitative data. Collective action and claim-making are contingent, thus I interview community leaders, and unorganized migrants in order to hear their concerns and views about the perceived need or not for political self-organization and collective action. These views will probably depend on the reason of their migration. As Sayad (2004) reminds us, every immigration entails an emigration and thus it is a mistake to separate these two phenomena, which is why fieldwork in both the countries of origin and destiny is necessary (see also Thomas and Znaniecki 1927; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Levitt 2001; Smith 2006). Studying sites of high emigration in Mexico, Morocco, and Algeria will shed light on the relationship between economic rationales and the culture of migration (Cohen 2004) to see whether the idealization of the place of destiny, incomplete information about economic prospects after migration, remittance behavior, and “the myth of return” hold across countries (Castañeda-Tinoco 2006; Castañeda 2004; Sayad 2004). This information does not take away from the issues of claim-making and political incorporation but on the contrary, since understanding the

causes for migration and settlement can help us understand the prospects for assimilation (Alba and Nee 2003) and the most burning political concerns of migrants and locals.

I visited Algeria and Morocco in order to get a sense of whether they view migration as a temporal strategy to increase household income through remittances or whether they would have a desire to settle and get incorporated to the French polity if they were to live in France. The author will compare field notes on the Algerian culture of migration with his previous work in Mexico (Castañeda 2006), and the ethnographic observations of Abdelmalek Sayad (2004), Pierre Bourdieu (Wacquant 2004), and other scholars.

Comparative Study of the Mechanisms for Claim Making and Political Inclusion of Immigrant Groups

The following tables show different criteria and preliminary observations for the comparison across cases and forms part of the background in which to place the three main flows to be studied. The purpose of these tables is not to determine a single causal mechanism but to inform the contextual differences and possible similarities. These tables do not aim to exhaust possible variations but to explain the logic of the comparison, provide basic information, and list aspects to compare and research gaps to fill. Part of the research task is to find measures to meaningfully compare cases along these criteria. At the end this project will be able to answer these questions, and to underline the most important similarities and differences among different sites. The data will signal which are the most important lines of voice and division which are analyzed in more detail in the dissertation.

Table 1.1: Similarities and Differences

Countries/ Criteria	Mexico/U.S.	Mexico/Spain	Morocco/Spain	Algeria/France
Migratory context	Proximity, 100 years of immigration	New migration, Former Colony	Proximity, Former colony (in both senses)	Proximity, Former Colony, 100 years of immigration
Majority Religion	Catholic/ Protestant	Catholic/ Catholic	Muslim/ Catholic	Muslim/ Catholic
Language	Spanish, Indigenous / English, Spanish	Spanish/ Spanish, Catalan, Basque	Arabic, Berber, French/ Spanish, Catalan, Basque	Arabic, Berber, French/ French
Ideological Preferences of the Receiving State	Legality, Ethnic/Racialization, Celebrant Multicultural	Racial and religious homogeneity, New Tolerant Multiculturalism	Racial and religious homogeneity, New Tolerant Multiculturalism	Strong preference for cultural and religious homogeneity (secularism), Monoculturalism

Table 1.2: Questions to Answer through Secondary Sources

Countries/ Criteria	Mexico/U.S.	Mexico/Spain	Morocco/Spain	Algeria/France
Access to government services, including health, education, housing and welfare	Yes when legal and partial access for undocumented depending on the city and state	Yes, when legal. Private and professional channels	Yes, when legal Catholic charities, and civil society organization	Yes, when legal Minimum services for uninsured
Inclusive Discourse in Public Sphere	Medium - ambivalent Latino vs. Illegal	Localized	Negative - Medium	Medium - Negative
Path to Citizenship Before/ Now	Short [IRCA 1987] / Long	Short / Short	Long / Short (Zapatero)	Short(former colony)/ Long
Policing	Medium	Low	Medium	High

Table 1.3: New Empirical Answers

Countries/ Criteria	Mexico/U.S.	Mexico/Spain	Morocco/Spain	Algeria/France
Rational for Migration	Economic, Aspirational, Networks and Culture of Migration	Economic Expected Cultural Affinity	Economic Aspirational	Economic, Political, Aspirational, Networks and Culture of Migration
Relationship between Remittances & Development	Slightly above subsistence	Low remitting behavior	Slightly above subsistence	Above subsistence, good among Kabyles
Access to Job Markets and Social Mobility of First & Second Generations	Easy access to low status jobs/ low access to high status jobs	Adequate access to high status qualified jobs/ High access	Easy access to low status jobs/ low access to high status jobs	Easy access to low status jobs/ hard access to all jobs certain entry for highly skilled integrated second generation
Political Participation	Sporadic, reactive, local grassroots, transnational	Limited to professional associations and to learning the system rules (functional integration)	Low Deemed as secondary and unnecessary	High but fragmented, done at the individual level vis-à-vis the national government
Common Channels for Voice and Claim-making	Community organizations, Catholic Church, Local leaders, Intellectuals, academics, activists	Limited, through consular means, and individual legal channels	Limited, apolitical cosmopolitan identity, third parties, NGOs, government bodies, Arab associations	Paris Mosque (peripheral), individual rights but little collective voice

Conclusion

Multisite fieldwork allowed for the study of specific mechanisms of us/them boundary-making, and the resulting racism and xenophobia framed as inherent and irreconcilable cultural differences that block integration (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Brubaker 2004). Field visits contributed to the understanding of the functioning of agenda-setting in the public sphere in general, and about practices of citizenship and political incorporation of newcomers. All these are pressing issues for most societies contemporary and historical (Barkey 1997, 2008). This project studies how different immigrant groups voice their demands in the United States, France and Spain; looking at the specific processes and mechanisms that construct differences among groups, and the dynamics that may favor different types of political voice and claim-making.

The proven hypothesis being that: the political inclusion of immigrants would depend on the social and institutional contexts of reception, immigration policies, racial understandings, and citizenship regimes of the host country. The more institutional avenues, the more integrated the immigrant population will feel, and the more it will act within institutionalized channels; the less institutional collective avenues are open for immigrants and minorities the more contentious the immigrants will be and the less integrated they will feel. This hypothesis is reasonable but the interesting part is in seeing how it works, the general process and mechanisms that foster and inhibit successful immigrant assimilation.

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