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SOCIETY AND THE STATE* Some Neglected Areas of Research and Theory

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I

THE AIR is full of many voices today saying "Lo, here," and "Lo, there," warning the public about contemporary trends in our national life. On the one hand, there is much fearsome talk of the dangers of statism as leading finally to total governmental control. On the other, there are many who contend that only the state can save us from going to pieces, that as the largest and most powerful agency, it should take over more and more areas of social control.

I have long thought that a discussion of the relation of the state to society was among the topics appropriate to an occasion such as this. Now, having but recently returned from a second "tour of duty" with that great example of state socialism—the Army—I am more convinced than ever that this subject will bear examination. Whether our soldiers and veterans realize it or not, they have experienced at least one form of more or less complete state control in a vast organization in which personal initiative generally is punished and in which conformity is the key to success.

In any case, aside from wartime improvisa-

tions, we have, in recent decades, been witnessing distinctive institutional changes and corresponding alterations in individual values with respect to the place of the state in our total social-cultural life. It seems to me, further, that these changes present a field for research and theoretical considerations which sociologists may well take seriously. The changes bound up with the state-society relationship, in fact, are certain to affect all sorts of other areas of sociological investigation, such as, those bearing on home and family, the school, industry, and recreation—to name only a few.

The problems having to do with state-societal relations are legitimate research interests for sociologists. Our colleagues in political science have recently been so engrossed in studying the details of administrative paraphernalia that they have ignored this topic. We will do well to put at least some of our effort into an analysis of this far-reaching subject.

Before going further it will be well to define the major concepts to be used in this discussion in order to avoid any serious misunderstanding as to meanings. I shall use the term *society*, not in its generic meaning of any group in interaction, but rather in its popular, yet fully accepted, sense of a

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national society, usually designated by some adjective as "American society," "British society," or "Russian society." So defined a society means a relatively large mass of people of a common culture, usually with the same language, who occupy a given territory, possess common values, and in our own time tend to set up their own state system. By *state* I mean the political or governmental organization which has, in modern times, come to exercise central, sovereign, and over-all control. Closely linked to the concept of society is that of the *community*. By this term we refer to a limited locality grouping of people within a national society, usually with a common trade or economic center and host of other socio-political functions, such as, local government, education, religion, and recreation. The crucial matter in the relation of society to the state is that of *power* or control. We shall use control or power in the sense of its larger public aspects, both governmental or non-governmental.

It is a commonplace today that under technological advance the world is moving into an industrialized society marked by the loss of many of our basic primary-group patterns and values and the emergence of many new associational and cultural forms. One accompaniment of these changes is the present era of big states. Some social scientists who take a "wave-of-the-future" view of cultural trends seem unwilling to look critically at the possible meaning of these changes, especially as they concern the place of government in relation to other institutions. Many take for granted that the state is the proper and only agency to accomplish what may be called the general aims of the people in any national society. These proponents pooh-poo the idea that much can be expected from working relations developed between various special-interest groups, or from voluntary community associations. In short, they assume that mass society, characterized by high specialization of roles and the dissipation of primary and small-community groups, indicates that the state and only the state remains as an effective means of getting things done,

either for the individual or for men in association. They see this with respect to domestic policy and even more so with regard to problems of war and peace on the international front, especially in view of considerable popular hysteria about the potential destructiveness of the atom-bomb.

Others, often with a nostalgic yen for the past, "view with alarm" such shifts in control and even attribute the growth of state power to the evil designs of individuals or parties. They yearn for the good old days when the state played a minor and negative role of watchdog to protect persons and property in a society of competing and conflicting interests. Some in this camp believe that steps may be taken to keep alive the alleged virtues of the community and voluntary associations of men if only we do not succumb to the subtle pressures and propaganda which suggest that more and more societal operations should be left to the state. Many individuals in this latter group reflect either the liberalistic-individualistic or the Christian tradition or both.

It is evident that we are faced with certain competing or conflicting value-practice systems in the modern world. On the one hand, we have a number of national societies which are committed in theory and, in part, in practice to democratic-representative systems. These take the traditional position that a given national society, made up of a wide variety of individual and group interests, should remain dominant over the state as a power agency. This superiority or dominance of the society over the state is expressed in those cultural values which historically came to be called "natural rights": free speech, free assemblage, trial by jury of peers, provisions for "due process," the writ of *habeus corpus*, secret balloting and free elections, and others. In terms of a favorite Fourth-of-July cliché the "state is the servant not the master of the people." On the other hand, we find the authoritarian or totalitarian state which in theory and practice moves to absorb societal functions, so that as time goes on state and society become co-terminus. In such a situation the state controls not only the

economic life, but, more and more, all other aspects of national and personal existence: the family, education, religion, recreation, arts, and communication.

It is not that one system is inherently superior to the other. All the evidence of cultural anthropology and history shows that man is amazingly adaptable to a variety and differing intensity of controls. In setting up this dichotomy there is no intention to commit anyone to favor one or the other. But it is well to bear in mind that divergent value-systems, as they work out, may produce quite different results for individuals and groups. While few, if any, of us can get very far outside the cultural and personal framework of our own lives, we should not hesitate to apply our techniques and theories to trying to discover just how the extension of state power is working out under such contrasting value-systems.

It would be ideal if we could collect, compare, and analyze data from various contrasting state-society systems, especially from the United States, Britain, and Soviet Russia. But this is to expect too much. We can secure data from ourselves and from Britain if she retains scientific freedom as she moves toward a planned and state-managed economy. But as to getting adequate data from Soviet Russia we are up against apparently insurmountable obstacles in attempting to procure valid factual information or to get an opportunity to make anything approaching objective studies on the ground. Students of comparative culture will have to be satisfied with making the best of what data they can secure from the U.S.S.R. Authoritarianism evidently fears a free science as we know it. This fact itself ought to be reckoned with in evaluating social systems comparatively.

There are many topics which might be examined here, but I shall confine myself, first, to the growth of state control over the economic order and to the closely related subject of planning as a function of the state. Second, there are certain important sociological implications in the expansion of state power as it touches administrative, legislative, and judicial operations. Finally, the

personal meaning of shifts in values must be examined, for, if culture affects personality, as we have come generally to believe, the growth of governmental control will inevitably have an influence upon the life organization of individuals.

II

Perhaps the greatest and most basic change in the relation of the state to the non-governmental aspects of national society has to do with the economic order. We certainly have moved a long way from the position of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries which held that the chief function of government was to provide protection to person, property, and contract at home, and to defend the country against its enemies abroad. The state has come increasingly to regulate the economic processes in the name of the general welfare or to aid some special interest group or other in their struggle for a larger share of national income. For decades business secured support through high tariffs, rationalized in the name of weak "infant industries" which could not stand competition in the world markets. More recently farm groups and labor organizations have had the help of government in the name of equalizing their competitive strength in the struggle for a share in the nation's wealth. So, too, controls have been introduced to maintain the competitive system in the face of monopolies.

In our country these and other controls have been introduced in piecemeal and even haphazard fashion. They have often been improvised on the spot in the face of some immediate crisis. Few, if any, have come as a result of long-range and deliberate planning. Committed as we were in the past century to a competitive market system, the state functioned largely as arbiter or referee. The aim of the state was to see that all comers had a relatively equal chance in the market or, in the case of public utilities, to see that the consuming public was not overcharged for the services rendered.

The impact of two large-scale wars upon us has been impressive. In the period just past we ran the gamut from federal control

of raw materials, prices, and wages in privately owned industries to out-and-out ownership and management of large enterprises by the government itself. Some welcome these steps and would keep them in peace time since they are thought to be a healthy movement toward state socialism—statism at its best. On the other hand, despite temporary expedients in reconversion, there are strong pressures from both ownership and labor unions to revive the *status quo ante*. Yet we hardly expect to witness any very complete return to a period when the government played a passive, policeman's role. In this country we may anticipate more government planning and a further extension of a variety of controls though most of these will continue to be ameliorative and piecemeal in character.

When we turn to authoritarian countries we see that the whole economy is regulated to an amazing detail. Raw materials, labor force, hours, wages, housing and a large number of other aspects of gaining a living are controlled by state agencies. What we find there is a permanent condition which we have been forced to imitate during a total war, a system which is not congenial to our basic values in times of peace. As we return to something approaching our prewar economic operations, the contrasts between the two systems of economy are certain to be brought sharply before us.

While most of the research in reference to the problems raised by these changes falls to the economists and political scientists, the sociologists also have some responsibility to contribute to an understanding of what these shifts mean. Particularly we need to study changes in opinion, attitude, and habit with regard to such matters as ownership, management, risk-bearing and the like. We need to compare the ideas, attitudes, and habits of people living under a completely state-managed economy with those of people under other systems. Is management, at least on the psychological level, the same in a free market system as it is under a planned and regulated one? What effects may over-all state control have on the motivations of managers and workers with ref-

erence to such matters as desire to become more efficient, personal honesty, self-advancement, sense of participation in plant operation, and interest in general welfare? What happens to the values of a worker when state fixing of prices and wages permanently replaces collective bargaining, a scheme developed outside the orbit of government? When legal controls of finance and profit increase—as they do in the United States—what happens to the willingness of individuals to take risks which may be compensated by adequate returns? Will the traditional views regarding personal savings, thrift, life insurance, and hard work—to note a few long-standing values—all be altered as we move in the direction of an over-all state management of our economy? Will the promise of “security” which is said to go with such controls be sufficient to offset the likely loss of individual initiative, opportunities for self-expression, and free choice of job or enterprise? Just what is the content of security—economic and emotional—provided by over-all state controls?

These queries as to the comparative effects lead into a consideration of planning. There is no better illustration of the forceful impact of the state upon us than the emergence of widespread interest in planning at local, state, and federal levels. The air is full of talk and the mails full of pamphlets and books on all aspects of this subject. In fact, in some quarters, the whole subject of planning has taken on the appearance of a cult. The zeal and promise of the would-be planners often quite outruns their objective contribution in terms of analysis or prediction of events.

Planning, of course, is not something new in this world. It simply means the collection and use of facts and principles designed to direct or control future operations of some kind. Such blueprints for the future also imply certain goals, supported by values of one kind or another. Private enterprise, soul-hungry religionists, and no end of others have long planned their particular campaigns in advance. The topic today has become pertinent because for many people

planning has become synonymous with state planning. This very delimitation—so common in Europe especially—is the nub of the matter. It reveals clearly how far we have drifted, even in our capitalist world, toward state control.

Such planned regulations began in our country, in a mild way, with the public recognition that we were wasting such natural resources as our timber, but it was not until the New Deal that relatively large-scale national and state planning got underway. The recent war has obviously further stimulated concern with government planning.

However, in line with our cultural traditions, most of our federal or other governmental planning has been piecemeal and of relatively limited type. While socialist-minded individuals cry out for long-range and complete planning, the American public has not yet taken this view. But we do have some experience with planned projects of our own, and could compare this with planned operations in other countries.

The most striking contrasts, of course, appear between complete, over-all planning and regulation and the less extensive and more limited planning of our own. In the former, planning is carried out by the imposition of laws and regulations from a centralized body at the top to the lower social echelons which have little or no control about the plans or the methods of carrying them out. In some of our own operations we have tried to develop public planning by beginning at the other end. A grass-roots version of this was the County Land-use Planning program of the federal Department of Agriculture which was shelved during the war. Another of somewhat similar type is found in the development of the Soil Conservation Districts, of which there are now several hundreds covering millions of acres of land. In these programs the governmental agencies cooperate with the land-owners in programs of soil and water conservation.

These two programs of combined government and community control stand in sharp contrast to centralized dominance, of the "take it or else" variety, found under

authoritarianism. Perhaps this slower, milder, and more democratic development is indicative of certain possible trends in state control which might come to be used in other areas of our national life. But we do not, as yet, have any fully satisfactory answers as to the effectiveness or meaning of such programs in action. We ought to know, not only what economic effects these projects have had, but also about the shifts in individual attitudes toward government, with regard to the rights of private ownership when in conflict with assumed community needs, and other matters growing out of this cooperation of state and society.

Along with studies of government-sponsored planning, it would be well to examine planned programs worked out between management and organized labor as illustrations of other areas of planning. These schemes have to do with all sorts of shop operations and day-by-day difficulties in plant or business. They represent cooperative rather than conflicting relations between different interest-groups which may point the way to potential accommodations without recourse to state oversight or control of any kind. Moreover such democratic methods of cooperation may and do develop in non-economic groups also. With us planning and cooperation are not as yet state monopolies.

The topic of planning brings up the old familiar means-ends discussion. To set up high-sounding unimpeachable goals is not enough. Of great importance are the manner and method of implementing these planned changes. How well do the techniques proposed meet the ends sought? What are the possible by-products of these means? Will the devices used entail in indirect consequences problems worse than those which the planners seek to solve? It seems to me there is much loose talk about "planning" for freedom, for diversity, and for scientific and esthetic development. Such promising clichés means little or nothing unless cast into some measurable form. What checks, for instance, are there on the power laid in the hands of planners under authoritarian or under democratic systems? Will the growing regulation of economic action in

a democracy lead, in the end, to the disappearance of traditional individual liberties? And will the dissipation of so-called "natural rights" bring some better satisfactions in their stead?

III

Let us turn now to examine some of the changes within government itself, and in the relations of government agencies to the non-governmental elements in the national society, as state power expands.

One of the most evident shifts in our country has been the extension of administrative functions. The very passage of new regulatory laws brings in its wake a growth of boards and administrators to enforce the same. Perhaps it is just such bureaucratic extensions which disturb the old-line liberal the most, for he senses in the new controls a subtle movement toward what is sometimes called "the administrative state"—said, by some, to be one important characteristic of fascism.

The increase in the sheer number of government employees is an obvious effect of administrative expansion. Moreover, in a highly industrialized society, there is a greater demand for skilled technicians—a fact which itself puts some limitations on the spoils system—that old political device to tie the state and the citizen together through a job. The function of such trained personnel runs all the way from that of the research scientist and the engineer through the experienced policy-maker to the day-by-day administrative operator.

This change in the type of work demanded by government leads at once to a series of problems. In the matter of occupational analysis and the selection and training of run-of-the-mill personnel we have made real improvement. There is still need for research in the selection of policy-makers and other "leaders." The work done in the Office of Strategic Services in picking undercover and other operators and that done by the British War Office Selection Boards in passing on candidates for officer-training in the British army provide suggestive leads for peacetime selection of certain types of gov-

ernment personnel. Already some industrial and business firms are making use of modifications of these methods in the selection of their top personnel. These methods take into account not only physical fitness and general intelligence, but social-emotional and irrational elements as well. There is a challenging area of investigation in this field which should not be overlooked by sociologists and social psychologists.

Of more importance perhaps and certainly of equal or greater difficulty is the solution of that perennial problem of the relation of the expert to the policy-maker. It is all very well and easy for some of our colleagues to argue that if we had only scientific findings the answers in policy would be self-evident. Granted this counsel of perfection, we seldom possess sufficient pertinent facts and in the meantime human choices or decisions of program-making must be made. It is especially important to take into account the basic value system which lies behind any particular proposal. But who is to say if the expert's weighing is correct as against that of the politician policy-maker? It is here that representatives of the citizenry who will be affected by administrative decisions must be taken into account, at least in a democratic society. To cite an example: In the heyday of the New Deal in agriculture there were continual battles between experts and politician policy-makers as to just how such agencies as the Farm Security Administration and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration should work out their programs. Not only were there amazing inconsistencies in the aims of these two agencies, but even within each of these agencies planning, fact finding, and administrative decision were often at odds.

Or take an illustration from the "planned economy" of Soviet Russia. There is ample evidence that *cost* of production is frequently ignored in terms of some larger over-all goal of total output. In other words efficient plants—from our angle—are obliged to support less efficient ones in terms, not of straight economic, but of political-party aims. Just how long—aside from wartime conditions—such economic losses will be

tolerated in the total economy is not merely a matter of the economic-managerial expert's decision but of some politically, perhaps irrationally, based value.

Just where—in these cases—does the role of the expert cease and that of the policy-making administrator move in? What we need to know with reference to this question is, first, how do the expert and administrator interact as this relates; and secondly, to the manner in which the latter derives his policy. Aside from data secured from some narrative diaries of policy-making conferences, we know very little about the detailed process of making policy decisions, involving such matters as prestige, status, and dominance-submission relations, bargaining for distribution of power, the arriving at compromises, and the anticipation of the impact of policy decisions on the voting behavior of citizens and the public response generally.

A most vital area in state-societal relations has to do with the role of the legislative agencies in any given system of government. It is quite generally recognized that the legislative function is basic to the democratic representative system while it is assumed that in authoritarian states these functions tend to be less important since those of the administrative agencies are dominant. In other words, in the administrative state the essential law and policy-making functions are performed in camera by the leading party-state officials or by carefully selected and controlled legislative bodies. In the democratic scheme under the assumption that the people of the community or national society are the dominant source of power, the legislative agency becomes the medium through which the will of the people is made manifest. Granted a legal framework of basic principles and controls—a constitution—the legislative body is charged essentially with passing statutes, levying taxes, and determining at least the broad lines of public policy. It has also the important investigatory power to see that administrative and judicial functions—as determined by law—are properly fulfilled.

As administrative functions expand, how-

ever, especially witnessed under such national emergencies as a depression or a large war, the role of the legislative agency seems to decline. The cumbersome operations of traditional legislative bodies become most apparent when an impatient and hasty public cries for more and more action. Yet, despite its institutional inefficiencies, the legislative body remains the chief link between the government and the citizenry to which state powers are in the end—under our value system—responsible.

Under our system there are a number of methods by which power flows from societal forces to governmental agencies. The basic one is the legal election through which representatives are chosen to carry out, in the main lines at least, what the public wants or thinks it wants. So, too, in some cases there are provisions for the operations of the initiative, referendum and recall and though not widely used, they represent a potential public control in particular crises.

A second manner in which the flow of power from outside is kept going is through pressure groups, representing special interests—economic, moral, educational, and others. Some people fear that these associations, often pretending to speak in the name of the general public, are likely to wreck our representative system. But so far they have not done so, but they do reveal the conflict for power in the national society as it tends to be reflected or transmitted into governmental operations of one form or another. Perhaps one of the most serious problems in this area is that important segments of the population are not represented by pressure groups. Others are over-represented. At present corporate interests, organized labor, and commercial farmers have strong lobbies while the consumer public, unorganized laborers, and tenant farmers do not.

A third and increasingly potent means of keeping contact between the legislature and public outside is for the latter to express agreement or disagreement with state policies. The "letters to the senator" type is one, as "letter to the editor" is another common device. Perhaps more effective, be-

cause more representative, are the straw votes—now called public polls—which provide a means of periodic sampling of the climate of public opinion. The techniques of sampling and for taking the polls have become highly efficient. Our greatest need now is to work out devices for getting at qualitative differences in opinion, and especially to work out means of predicting more accurately from opinion to overt action—still the crux of the matter of public polling. Yet, despite its limitations, the public poll is a useful instrument for mobilizing opinions and attitudes of the general community and/or special groups or classes within the community. It is obviously tied up with the retention of a free press, of freedom of speech, the right to assemblage and other devices for expressing public reaction to public issues. In a way, we might say that the spread of such a method of tapping public sentiment and opinion over the world is itself a measure of the presence or absence of representative democracy.

That is not to say, of course, that under authoritarian forms devices are not used by the dominant Party to discover what the masses are thinking and talking about. We know that under National Socialism, the Nazis had good means of following drifts in public discussion in Germany. Apparently, the Communist Party, too, is not unfamiliar with methods of sampling thought and talk among the workers and others of the U.S.S.R. But in the authoritarian system it is the government or the Party which employs such devices. With us these methods have grown up under non-governmental aegis. They belong, in practice and in terms of our values, essentially outside the government. Of course, our government may and does use its own polling devices. It had them in the army with an eye to discovering the factors that made for, or undermined, morale. The Department of Agriculture's Division of Program Surveys takes polls of farmers with a view to aiding policy makers to know what are the drifts in attitude, opinion, and practice among American farmers. We may expect pressure from certain administrative agencies to extend gov-

ernment-controlled polls. But so long as those outside are not interfered with, and if the results of both governmental and non-governmental surveys are published without let or hindrance, there is little danger of abuse from the use of such devices.

There are also interesting and important changes going on with respect to the function of the third of our governmental agencies—the judiciary. Sociologists, with one or two exceptions, have neglected the potentials of research in this field. The development of quasi-legal administrative bodies, of course, have been studied as to structure and function by political scientists and lawyers. So, too, the fluctuating importance of the Supreme Court has been the topic of considerable scholarly comment. But the broader implications of such changes with reference to our major topic—the relation of the state to society—have not been explored and might profitably be examined by individuals of sociological orientation.

Also social psychological studies of the day-by-day judicial operations are needed. The law courts represent an area in which members of the community or public come into contact with the state as a power agency. Yet we know very little of a systematic sort about the routine operations of the courts, about the play of pressure-group influences, or the role of moral-religious affiliations and values on legal decisions, on the make-up of the judicial personnel in terms of personality structure—to mention only a few topics of importance. Some work has been done with respect to crime and delinquency and the actions of domestic relations' courts. We need to know more about the interplay of the statute, its interpretation in particular cases, and the social and personality factors operating in the decision of judge or jury.

IV

Aside from the implications of sound research for such topics as economic organization, planning, and the day-by-day operation of governmental agencies themselves, there remains the larger problem of observing and interpreting these shifts in

power as they influence the basic values of our society and as these changes, in turn, imply or indicate changes in the basic personality make-up of individuals. This vast subject demands serious and extended treatment just to lay out the various areas that need examination. We can but mention a few of the larger issues.

First of all we may indicate that values as such are most important data in our sociological analyses. Moreover they may be described and analyzed as natural phenomena, not as something super-cultural or super-human. Granted their essential non-rational basis, the *fact* of the value—no matter its source—must be established and reckoned with in the total analysis and must be taken into account in prediction and planning. One central feature of the analysis of the value system is its relation to the personality make-up. As values change, so, too, does individual life organization.

One crucial instance of shifts in values is expressed in the opposing ideas of demands for economic security—supported by public means—as against willingness or readiness to fend for oneself, to take business risks, in short to continue in our older individualistic tradition. There seems reason for saying that as the primary-group values and their protective ego-satisfying relations disappear or become, at least, more tenuous in the face of segmentalized, rationalistic, but impersonal relations of plant or shop, of daily mass movement, and of residence, there is a heightening of the sense of loneliness and anonymity. The “pioneer” spirit of self-assurance, invention, initiative, risk-taking and new adventure gives way to the “safety” spirit which seeks refuge in a permanent job for everybody with fixed income and an assured policy of public retirement pensions.

There is a real need to investigate the meaning of such changes in values and corresponding overt action. There is no doubt but that the fate of even a reasonable facsimile of a free enterprise system is related to this increasing consciousness of the need for security. It is evident in what has happened to new business investment and risk-

bearing. True, there are institutional hide-outs under capitalism for those who prefer fixed even though low interest returns to taking chances on new enterprises which may provide larger returns but which always involve the alternative chance of total loss. But the very tendency of people to move toward such islands of safety in an uncertain economic sea is further evidence of the fear of risk and of the desire for security.

Aside from the economic aspects of security, there seem to be tendencies to avoid or escape other kinds of insecurity. There is much talk of the disorganizing effects of emotional anxieties and many people have strong impulses to look to a social system which will fix up human relations in such a way that these difficulties will not arise. Many believe that emotional disturbances can be greatly reduced if not eliminated by adequate educational, recreational, and familial patterns. We really do not have any satisfactory scientific knowledge on this matter. What we have is chiefly a lot of wishful thinking. We need more careful studies of just how a highly stable social order, with its group and class relations more or less fixed by institutional arrangement, operates upon the individual. That is, what is the outcome of a totalistic process of socialization in such matters as anxiety, sense of security, competitiveness and co-operation? And, per contra, with respect to initiative and willingness to take risks? If we value individual initiative, a wide range of personal choice as to occupation, mating, housing, recreation, religion and so on, does this mean that these values must be purchased at considerable cost in insecurity, anxiety and perhaps interpersonal and group conflict and competition?

We are beginning to accumulate some evidence on these matters from our comparative studies of culture and personality. No one has yet put these findings into a systematic framework against some of these larger issues, but this is a task for the theorist. If we are to make any use of scientific findings in predicting trends—even though we may not be able to control all aspects of them by planning—we need to

know more about the relation of values to personality. There does not seem any likelihood that man will change his long habits of deriving his values and much of his action from irrational motives or wants, nor does there seem any evidence that he will discontinue rationalizing his values and actions in supernatural or other mystic terms—evidence perhaps of the very need for such conceptions. And whether we like the drift toward more state control because it promises more security and certainty even if it means also the loss of risk taking and personal choice in job, residence and many other items now taken for granted, or whether we fear and disapprove of these drifts for a variety of reasons, there is no doubt that we need more adequate knowledge of just what these changes mean to us both as individuals and as groups.

Certainly, assuming the shift toward more and more state control, we can legitimately raise the question as to just what form this may take. Does it mean that we can not keep the system of democratic representation alive? Or is it possible that democratic representation may be applied in other areas

of human relationship? Is there a place for the community and social groups outside governmental aegis even though state power has expanded in the meantime? These matters need study. But in addition to facts we must always reckon with values and goals. If we highly prize personal initiative and competitiveness—to note two of our current values, even though they are accompanied by uncertainties, both economic and emotional—on the theory that in the long run initiative and competition will yield greater personal as well as cultural dividends, then we will as citizens and as scientists want to examine and evaluate the nature of changes which come with the expansion of the state. And of special concern will be the manner in which the democratic representative values may be kept alive in the face of these trends. Perhaps we can not avoid more and more state control, but more adequate knowledge of the form and direction it takes and its relation to democratic operations should help us as citizens to make more adequate choices as alternative schemes of control are put before us in the coming years.

TEACHING SOCIAL SCIENCE AS A SET OF SKILLS¹

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I STARTED to teach in a fashion, typical enough, I suppose, of inexperienced instructors. Despite several years of training in sociology and political science, I had never been stimulated to think about

teaching problems. Consequently, insofar as I was conscious of my teaching techniques at all, I formulated, or justified, procedures in terms, either of rationalizations about what I liked to do or guesses that what, I thought, had been effective in teaching me would work with my students. As I acquired experience, I learned that such rationalizations and guesses were not, by themselves,

¹This paper was originally read at the Fourth Annual Conference for Teachers of the Social Sciences in High Schools and Junior Colleges, University of Chicago, June, 1944. It has since been revised, with especial reference to the problems which those teaching freshman and sophomore courses in the social sciences may encounter. However, it is still, for the most part relevant to high school teaching of social studies, since, in practice, college teachers, more often than not, have to do what high school teachers have not done, rather than what high school teachers could not do. And, for the same reason, it is relevant to divisional or

graduate teaching, since, again, college teachers do not succeed in achieving what they might have.

I have been stimulated by Professors Earl Johnson of Chicago, A. W. Levi of Black Mountain, and Robert Thornton of Puerto Rico, in my analysis of teaching processes, and wish to express my indebtedness to them. Needless to say, this does not commit them to agreement with anything I say.